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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-3115 
____________ 
 
IN RE: KEVIN PATRICK FLOOD, 
     Petitioner 
 __________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from  
the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (Related to D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-00082)  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21 
September 13, 2012 
 
Before:   AMBRO, JORDAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 3, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Kevin Patrick Flood has filed a petition for writ of mandamus, asking that we 
vacate an interlocutory order of the District Judge entered in his civil rights action, and 
that his case be reassigned to a different District Judge and different Magistrate Judge.  
For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition. 
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 Flood, while awaiting trial in federal court on drug and weapons charges, filed a 
civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by certain 
members of the Pennsylvania State Police who participated in his arrest and 
interrogation.  He claimed that the state police used an informant to plant drugs at his 
house and to administer drugs to him in order to weaken him during interrogation.  He 
also claimed that the state police illegally entered his home, and used improper and 
excessive interrogation techniques on him at the state police barracks.  The District Court 
dismissed the action without prejudice and Flood appealed.  We vacated the District 
Court’s order and remanded, holding that the court failed to analyze whether Flood’s 
Fourth Amendment claims, if successful, would necessarily undermine the validity of his 
criminal prosecution.  See Flood v. Schaefer, 240 Fed. Appx. 474 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Meanwhile, in Flood’s criminal case, following the denial of pretrial motions to 
suppress and for testing of audiotapes and other evidence, Flood was convicted of 
conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute 
marijuana, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  He was sentenced by the 
same District Judge who had presided over his civil rights action to a term of 
imprisonment of 180 months and 8 years of supervised release.  We affirmed the 
conviction and sentence on appeal, see United States v. Flood, 339 Fed. Appx. 210 (3d 
Cir. 2009), holding, in pertinent part, that probable cause supported the issuance of an 
anticipatory search warrant and that the District Court’s denial of Flood’s motion for the 
testing of audio recordings made by the confidential informant was not an abuse of 
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discretion.  With regard to the request to test the audiotapes, we agreed with the District 
Court that Flood had waived his right to request testing, see id. at 214, and we noted that, 
in any event, “the authenticity and accuracy of the evidence precluded the need to 
authorize funding for expert testing.”  Id.  
 On remand in Flood’s civil rights action, the District Court granted the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Flood again appealed.  We affirmed in 
part, holding that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), barred Flood’s claim 
that the state police tampered with the audiotapes offered as evidence in the federal 
criminal prosecution.  See Flood v. Schaefer, 367 Fed. Appx. 315, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2010).  
We reversed in part, holding that Flood’s Fourth Amendment claim alleging the use of 
excessive force during his interrogation was sufficiently pleaded.  See id. at 318 
(allegation that police were aware that inmate had severe back injury and caused him 
excessive pain and suffering by handcuffing him to metal folding chair in unheated room 
for ten hours during questioning states a Fourth Amendment claim).  Again, we 
remanded for further proceedings. 
On the second remand, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, and Flood appealed.  We again vacated the District Court’s order and 
remanded, holding, in pertinent part, that the court, in analyzing the excessive force 
claim, had improperly focused exclusively on the degree of Flood’s injury rather than on 
the force used by the state police during the interrogation.  See Flood v. Schaefer, 439 
Fed. Appx. 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (although objective evidence of injury is relevant in 
determining whether officer used excessive force, excessive force claim does not require 
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any particular degree of injury).  Flood also challenged in this appeal the Magistrate 
Judge’s order denying his motion to compel the production of the original audiotapes, 
which he contended would show that the defendants had prior knowledge of his severe 
back injury.  We directed the District Court to address this issue on remand, after further 
development of the record, if necessary.  See id.  
 Flood’s civil rights action went back to the District Court in July, 2011.  In 
accordance with our mandate, in an order filed on February 21, 2012, see Docket Entry 
No. 165, the District Court addressed Flood’s motion to compel the production of the 
audiotapes containing conversations between the informant and Flood, which Flood 
contended would demonstrate that the defendants had prior knowledge of his back injury.  
In the February 21, 2012 order, the District Court held that Flood was entitled to 
production of the audiotapes in his civil rights case, but, because he had already received 
accurate copies of the audiotapes and transcriptions of their contents in his criminal case, 
the Court would not compel the defendants to produce them a second time.  The court 
observed that Flood conceded that he had received copies of the tapes and the 
transcriptions.  The Court also noted Flood’s contention that his copies had been altered 
and tampered with, and that portions of the original tapes showing the defendants’ prior 
knowledge of his back injury had been deleted by his own court-appointed attorney.  It 
held, however, that Flood could not relitigate the spoliation issue in his civil rights case.  
Moreover, Flood’s claim that his own attorney had tampered with the audiotapes was 
baseless.  The Court then directed the parties to submit briefs on the issue of whether the 
force the state police used during Flood’s interrogation was reasonable under the 
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circumstances, and denied Flood’s motion to address a claim of a broad-based conspiracy 
to tamper with the audiotapes. 
 Flood then filed numerous motions in an attempt to pursue his claim of a 
conspiracy to tamper with the audiotapes.  He also filed a motion asking the District 
Court to reconsider its February 21, 2012 order, a pretrial statement addressing his 
excessive force claim, and a motion demanding that the District Court comply with our 
most recent mandate.  With respect to this latter motion, Flood acknowledged the District 
Court’s February 21, 2012 order, but found it illogical and biased.  In short, Flood 
reiterated his spoliation contentions and further contended that both the District Judge 
and Magistrate Judge were biased against him.  The defendants filed their brief, 
concluding that there was indeed a triable issue with respect to whether their handcuffing 
of Flood during the interrogation was reasonable under the circumstances.   
Flood then filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal.  On June 6, 2012, the 
Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation, recommending that a trial be 
scheduled.  The Magistrate Judge saw no basis for an interlocutory appeal and 
recommended that Flood’s motion to appeal be denied.  Flood then filed Objections to 
this Report and Recommendation, which remain pending. 
 At issue now, Flood has filed a petition for writ of mandamus, asking that we 
vacate the District Court’s February 21, 2012 order.  He has reiterated his concern that 
the District Court did not comply with our last mandate, and repeated his argument that 
the District Court incorrectly decided the spoliation issue in the face of “incontrovertible” 
evidence that the audiotapes were altered.  Flood asked that we order the defendants to 
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produce “accurate” copies of the original audiotapes and he asked for reassignment of his 
case to a different District Judge and different Magistrate Judge. 
 We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  Our jurisdiction derives from 28 
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  A writ of 
mandamus will only issue under extraordinary circumstances.  See Sporck v. Peil, 759 
F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1985).  To justify the use of this extraordinary remedy, a petitioner 
must show both a clear and indisputable right to the writ and that he has no other 
adequate means to obtain the relief desired.  See Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 
81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 Flood does not meet the stringent requirements for mandamus relief.  As a 
threshold matter, we conclude that the District Court complied with our directive in its 
February 21, 2012 order to address in the first instance Flood’s request to compel the 
production of the original audiotapes.  We asked nothing more than that the District 
Court address the matter, and the Court has ruled definitively against Flood on the issue 
of the audiotapes. 
With respect to the other matters raised by the mandamus petition, we note that 
Flood contends that the original audiotapes contain evidence favorable to his claim of 
excessive force, but he has not demonstrated that he has no alternative remedy or other 
adequate means to obtain the relief he desires.  Specifically, if Flood disagrees with the 
District Court’s ruling on the audiotapes issue, the proper course for him is to challenge 
the order on appeal when, and if, his civil rights case does not end in his favor.  A writ of 
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mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal.  See In re: Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 957 
(1997).  The original audiotapes, even assuming that they contain evidence relevant to the 
defendants’ prior knowledge of Flood’s severe back injury, are not clearly necessary to 
prove his claim of excessive force.  Presumably, Flood will testify in support of his claim 
that the state police used unreasonable force against him during their interrogation.  His 
personal knowledge about what happened to him during the interrogation and about what 
the defendants knew about his severe back injury prior to the interrogation, together with 
pertinent medical records if any, will give the jury the information it needs to determine 
the merits of his claim of a Fourth Amendment violation, and, if it transpires that the jury 
does not find in his favor, then he may appeal the judgment and argue that the District 
Court’s adverse ruling concerning production of the original audiotapes unfairly 
prevented him from proving his case.  Any harm caused by the District Court’s ruling can 
be adequately vindicated post-trial, if necessary. 
Last, Flood also has an alternative remedy and other adequate means to obtain the 
reassignment he desires in that he may seek recusal of the District Judge by filing a 
motion for recusal in the district court prior to trial, under the standards set forth in 28 
U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455.  Mandamus is not proper here because Flood has not 
shown a clear and indisputable right to recusal of either the District Judge or the 
Magistrate Judge on the basis of personal bias. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  
Flood’s motion to appoint a special master is denied. 
